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This study investigates the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance in Jordanian listed firms. It also explores the moderating impact of 
board ownership on the relationship between board of directors’ characteristics (i.e., 
board size, board independence, CEO duality, board meetings) and firm 
performance. Firm performance is measured using return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q. This study covers 90 listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
from 2014 to 2016 (N = 270). Hierarchical regression analysis is employed to 
examine if board ownership moderates the relationship between board of directors’ 
characteristics and firm performance. The findings show that board independence, 
Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO) duality, board meetings, managerial ownership, 
foreign ownership, audit committee presence and audit firm size are significantly 
and positively related to ROA. However, institutional ownership, family ownership 
and audit fees are significantly and negatively related to ROA. The findings also 
show that board independence, board meetings, managerial ownership, foreign 
ownership, family ownership, audit committee presence and audit firm size are 
significantly and positively related to Tobin’s Q. However, board size and 
institutional ownership are significantly and negatively related to Tobin’s Q. In 
addition, the results show that board ownership moderates the relationship between 
the board of directors’ characteristics and firm performance for both models (ROA 
and Tobin’s Q). The findings indicate that the interaction of board ownership and 
board of directors’ characteristics is significantly and negatively related to firm 
performance. This study concludes that good corporate governance mechanisms play 
a key role in improving the performance of firms. The current study presents 
practical evidence to the policymakers, academicians and all related parties in 
emerging markets, specifically in Jordan. 
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Kajian ini menyelidik pengaruh mekanisme tadbir urus korporat terhadap prestasi 
firma di firma-firma yang tersenarai di Jordan, di samping meneroka kesan 
penyederhanaan pemilikan lembaga ke atas hubungan antara ciri-ciri lembaga 
pengarah (seperti saiz dan kebebasan lembaga, kedualan ketua pengarah eksekutif 
(CEO), mesyuarat lembaga) dan prestasi firma. Prestasi firma diukur menggunakan 
pulangan ke atas aset (ROA) dan Tobin’s Q. Kajian ini mencakupi 90 buah firma 
yang tersenarai dalam Bursa Saham Amman (ASE) daripada tahun 2014 hingga 
2016 (N= 270). Analisis regresi berhierarki digunakan untuk menyelidik sekiranya 
pemilikan lembaga menyederhanakan hubungan antara ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah 
dan prestasi firma. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa kekebasan lembaga, kedualan 
ketua pengarah eksekutif (CEO), mesyuarat lembaga, pemilikan pengurusan, 
pemilikan asing, kehadiran jawatankuasa audit dan saiz firma audit berkaitan secara 
signifikan dan positif dengan ROA.Walau bagaimanapun, pemilikan keinstitusian, 
pemilikan keluarga dan yuran audit berkait secara signifikan dan negatif dengan 
ROA. Hasil kajian juga menunjukkan kebebasan lembaga, mesyuarat lembaga, 
pemilikan pengurusan, pemilikan asing, pemilikan keluarga, kehadiran jawatankuasa 
audit dan saiz firma berkaitan dengan Tobin’s Q secara signifikan dan positif. 
Namun, saiz lembaga dan pemilikan keinstitusian pulaberkait dengan Tobin’s Q 
secara signifikan dan negatif. Tambahan pula, hasil kajian juga menunjukkan 
bahawa pemilikan lembaga menyederhanakan hubungan antara ciri-ciri lembaga 
pengarah dan prestasi firma bagi kedua-dua model (ROA dan Tobin’s Q). Hasil 
kajian menunjukkan bahawa interaksi pemilikan lembaga dan ciri-ciri lembaga 
pengarah berkait secara signifikan dan negatif dengan prestasi firma. Kajian ini 
menyimpulkan bahawa mekanisma tadbir urus yang baik memainkan peranan 
penting dalam meningkatkan prestasi firma. Kajian ini memberikan bukti yang 
praktikal kepada penggubal dasar, ahli akademik dan pihak-pihak yang berkenaan 
dalam pasaran baharu, terutamanya di Jordan. 
 
Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat, pemilikan lembaga, prestasi firma, Bursa Saham 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
In today’s extremely dynamicand competitive business environment, high 
performance remains the most significant guarantee of firms’ survival. Generally, a 
firm’s ability to successfully achieve higher financial and superior business 
performance will be beneficial in terms of attracting potential and current investors 
and enjoying economies of scale. More importantly, the investors would want to 
invest in firms according to their prior evaluation of the firms’ performance 
indicators. Investors will, therefore, place the greatest trust in such firms over other 
firms. 
Furthermore, firms with strong markets and high financial performance will remain 
the most conducive environment for investors. Therefore, it is critical for the 
management, stakeholders and decision-makers to understand the critical benefits of 
business operations to enhance financial performance (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, & 
Fadzil, 2014). Such benefits are vital not only for the firm but also for the firm’s 
business customers and investors (Sayyar, Basiruddinb, Rasidc, & Elhabibd, 2015).  
With the above explanation, the issue of firm performance has become a key 
concern among business and management accounting managers, specifically after 
the crisis of Asian financial in 1997, moreover, to the global meltdown following the 
subprime mortgage crisis of 2007 through to 2008 and the numerous corporate 
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OLS Regression Result 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
LAV, AUFS, BIND, 
MOW, ACM, FOW, 
CEO, BMET, BSIZ, 
IOW, FS, FAOW, 
AUFb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .713a .508 .482 .05422 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, AUFS, BIND, MOW, ACM, FOW, CEO, BMET, 





Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .758 13 .058 19.834 .000b 
Residual .735 250 .003   
Total 1.493 263    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, AUFS, BIND, MOW, ACM, FOW, CEO, BMET, 















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.215 .066  -3.271 .001 
BSIZ -.002 .002 -.059 -1.081 .281 
BIND .139 .031 .228 4.489 .000 
CEO .022 .010 .107 2.159 .032 
BMET .003 .001 .105 2.149 .033 
MOW .163 .054 .187 2.994 .003 
IOW -.030 .014 -.130 -2.242 .026 
FOW .066 .016 .204 4.170 .000 
FAOW -.099 .028 -.228 -3.493 .001 
ACM .061 .010 .296 6.195 .000 
AUF -.039 .018 -.143 -2.100 .037 
AUFS .014 .008 .089 1.679 .094 
FS .043 .008 .335 5.056 .000 
LAV -.088 .018 -.241 -4.804 .000 
















OLS Regression Result 
Dependent Variable: Tobin’s Q 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 
LAV, AUFS, BIND, 
MOW, ACM, FOW, 
CEO, BMET, BSIZ, 
IOW, FS, FAOW, AUFb 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .591a .349 .315 .61634 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, AUFS, BIND, MOW, ACM, FOW, CEO, BMET, BSIZ, 





Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 50.985 13 3.922 10.324 .000b 
Residual 94.969 250 .380   
Total 145.954 263    
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, AUFS, BIND, MOW, ACM, FOW, CEO, BMET, BSIZ, 















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1.499 .747  -2.008 .046 
BSIZ -.051 .020 -.160 -2.576 .011 
BIND .880 .352 .146 2.499 .013 
CEO .162 .115 .080 1.407 .161 
BMET .047 .016 .164 2.932 .004 
MOW 1.362 .618 .158 2.204 .028 
IOW -.398 .154 -.171 -2.574 .011 
FOW .484 .179 .152 2.704 .007 
FAOW .617 .322 .144 1.917 .056 
ACM .257 .113 .125 2.277 .024 
AUF .289 .209 .108 1.378 .170 
AUFS .247 .094 .160 2.617 .009 
FS .111 .096 .088 1.162 .246 
LAV .280 .208 .078 1.345 .180 
















Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis Results.  
DV: Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 LAV, FSb . Enter 
2 
BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, 
MOW, BMET, AUFS, 
BSIZ, IOW, FAOW, 
AUFb 
. Enter 





a. Dependent Variable: ROA 















Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .400a .160 .153 .06933 .160 24.796 2 261 .000 
2 .713
b 
.508 .482 .05422 .348 16.069 11 250 .000 
3 .716c .513 .485 .05406 .005 2.476 1 249 .117 
4 .741
d 
.548 .515 .05246 .036 4.853 4 245 .001 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW, BOW*BMET, BOW*BSIZ, BOW*CEO, BOW*BIND 









Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .238 2 .119 24.796 .000b 
Residual 1.254 261 .005   
Total 1.493 263    
2 Regression .758 13 .058 19.834 .000c 
Residual .735 250 .003   
Total 1.493 263    
3 Regression .765 14 .055 18.703 .000d 
Residual .728 249 .003   
Total 1.493 263    
4 Regression .819 18 .045 16.525 .000e 
Residual .674 245 .003   
Total 1.493 263    
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 
BSIZ, IOW, FAOW, AUF 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 
BSIZ, IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.291 .055  -5.290 .000 
FS .047 .008 .370 6.233 .000 
LAV -.107 .022 -.293 -4.943 .000 
2 (Constant) -.215 .066  -3.271 .001 
FS .043 .008 .335 5.056 .000 
LAV -.088 .018 -.241 -4.804 .000 
BSIZ -.002 .002 -.059 -1.081 .281 
BIND .139 .031 .228 4.489 .000 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 BMET .003 .001 .105 2.149 .033 
MOW .163 .054 .187 2.994 .003 
IOW -.030 .014 -.130 -2.242 .026 
FOW .066 .016 .204 4.170 .000 
FAOW -.099 .028 -.228 -3.493 .001 
ACM .061 .010 .296 6.195 .000 
AUF -.039 .018 -.143 -2.100 .037 
AUFS .014 .008 .089 1.679 .094 
3 (Constant) -.229 .066  -3.467 .001 
FS .044 .008 .344 5.192 .000 
LAV -.092 .018 -.252 -4.987 .000 
BSIZ -.003 .002 -.079 -1.424 .156 
BIND .134 .031 .219 4.309 .000 
CEO .021 .010 .104 2.118 .035 
BMET .003 .001 .104 2.144 .033 
MOW .153 .055 .176 2.802 .005 
IOW -.053 .020 -.226 -2.688 .008 
FOW .063 .016 .196 3.979 .000 
FAOW -.124 .032 -.286 -3.825 .000 
ACM .062 .010 .300 6.281 .000 
AUF -.036 .018 -.134 -1.969 .050 
AUFS .013 .008 .084 1.583 .115 
BOW .035 .022 .118 1.573 .117 
4 (Constant) -.251 .065  -3.877 .000 
FS .047 .009 .366 5.460 .000 
LAV -.091 .018 -.249 -5.027 .000 
BSIZ -.002 .002 -.075 -1.348 .179 
BIND .163 .032 .266 5.044 .000 
CEO .019 .011 .093 1.824 .069 
BMET .003 .001 .117 2.437 .016 
MOW .177 .055 .204 3.196 .002 
IOW -.060 .019 -.255 -3.093 .002 
FOW .059 .016 .184 3.804 .000 
FAOW -.136 .032 -.314 -4.276 .000 









t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 AUF -.038 .018 -.139 -2.063 .040 
AUFS .013 .008 .083 1.593 .113 
BOW .037 .022 .126 1.685 .093 
BOW*BSIZ -.009 .004 -.120 -2.491 .013 
BOW*BIND -.011 .004 -.137 -2.718 .007 
BOW*CEO -.005 .003 -.077 -1.569 .118 
BOW*BMET -.006 .003 -.095 -2.042 .042 



























Hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis Results.  
DV: Tobin’s Q 
 
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 LAV, FSb . Enter 
2 
BIND, CEO, FOW, 
ACM, MOW, BMET, 
AUFS, BSIZ, IOW, 
FAOW, AUFb 
. Enter 






a. Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
















e df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .165a .027 .020 .73757 .027 3.645 2 261 .027 
2 .591b .349 .315 .61634 .322 11.252 11 250 .000 
3 .608c .369 .334 .60797 .020 7.927 1 249 .005 
4 .635d .403 .359 .59651 .033 3.417 4 245 .010 
a. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, BSIZ, 
IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW, BOW*BMET, BOW*BSIZ, BOW*CEO, BOW*BIND 









Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.966 2 1.983 3.645 .027b 
Residual 141.988 261 .544   
Total 145.954 263    
2 Regression 50.985 13 3.922 10.324 .000c 
Residual 94.969 250 .380   
Total 145.954 263    
3 Regression 53.915 14 3.851 10.419 .000d 
Residual 92.038 249 .370   
Total 145.954 263    
4 Regression 58.778 18 3.265 9.177 .000e 
Residual 87.176 245 .356   
Total 145.954 263    
a. Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q 
b. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS 
c. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 
BSIZ, IOW, FAOW, AUF 
d. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 
BSIZ, IOW, FAOW, AUF, BOW 
e. Predictors: (Constant), LAV, FS, BIND, CEO, FOW, ACM, MOW, BMET, AUFS, 







Coefficients   
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -.364 .586  -.622 .535 
FS .210 .080 .166 2.607 .010 
LAV -.019 .230 -.005 -.082 .935 
2 (Constant) -1.499 .747  -2.008 .046 
FS .111 .096 .088 1.162 .246 
LAV .280 .208 .078 1.345 .180 
BSIZ -.051 .020 -.160 -2.576 .011 
BIND .880 .352 .146 2.499 .013 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 BMET .047 .016 .164 2.932 .004 
MOW 1.362 .618 .158 2.204 .028 
IOW -.398 .154 -.171 -2.574 .011 
FOW .484 .179 .152 2.704 .007 
FAOW .617 .322 .144 1.917 .056 
ACM .257 .113 .125 2.277 .024 
AUF .289 .209 .108 1.378 .170 
AUFS .247 .094 .160 2.617 .009 
3 (Constant) -1.790 .744  -2.407 .017 
FS .135 .095 .107 1.425 .155 
LAV .201 .207 .056 .970 .333 
BSIZ -.064 .020 -.202 -3.200 .002 
BIND .775 .349 .128 2.217 .028 
CEO .153 .114 .075 1.341 .181 
BMET .047 .016 .163 2.951 .003 
MOW 1.164 .614 .135 1.896 .059 
IOW -.852 .222 -.367 -3.839 .000 
FOW .428 .178 .135 2.407 .017 
FAOW .115 .364 .027 .317 .752 
ACM .272 .111 .133 2.441 .015 
AUF .337 .207 .126 1.624 .106 
AUFS .231 .093 .150 2.474 .014 
BOW .706 .251 .241 2.816 .005 
4 (Constant) -1.741 .735  -2.369 .019 
FS .157 .097 .124 1.617 .107 
LAV .246 .205 .068 1.200 .231 
BSIZ -.076 .020 -.239 -3.740 .000 
BIND .624 .366 .103 1.705 .090 
CEO .105 .120 .052 .878 .381 
BMET .056 .016 .195 3.527 .001 
MOW 1.590 .630 .185 2.525 .012 
IOW -.798 .220 -.344 -3.625 .000 
FOW .349 .177 .110 1.975 .049 
FAOW -.031 .362 -.007 -.085 .932 
ACM .258 .110 .126 2.351 .020 












t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
 AUFS .208 .093 .135 2.241 .026 
BOW .662 .252 .226 2.631 .009 
BOW*BSIZ .030 .043 .039 .702 .484 
BOW*BIND .030 .048 .036 .627 .531 
BOW*CEO -.075 .036 -.120 -2.113 .036 
BOW*BMET -.104 .036 -.156 -2.918 .004 
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Rules of corporate governance have become one of the most important issues 
discussed in the world economies. They present an important factor that reinforces 
the success of economic and organizational reforms currently undertaken in the 
context of globalization; openness of economies towards each other; global 
competition; and in light of conditions and requirements of international 
organizations for accepting membership to countries or for dealing with countries 
of the world and with institutions and markets of these countries. Applying these 
rules and principles has become a slogan for public and private sectors, and a tool 
for enhancing confidence in any national economy and an evidence of the existence 
of fair and transparent polices for protecting investors and traders alike. It is also an 
indication to the level of professional commitments reached by the companies 
managements towards good governance, transparency and accountability, the 
existence of measures to limit corruption, and consequently raise the economy’s 
attractiveness to local and foreign investments and bolstering its competitiveness.  
This guide was prepared in view of the development of the national economy at all 
levels, and in line with the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC)’s efforts to develop 
the national capital market and its regulatory and organizational framework. It 
contains rules of corporate governance for shareholding companies listed at Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) for the purpose of establishing a clear framework that 
regulates their relations and management and defines their rights, duties and 
responsibilities in order to realize their objectives and safeguard the rights of all 
stakeholders. These rules are based principally on a number of legislations, mainly 
the Securities Law and related regulations, the Companies Law, and the 
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international principles established by the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).  
It should be noted that many of these rules are based on binding legal provisions in 
the above-mentioned laws. The rules did not delve in detail in many of the issues 
and requirements that they addressed. Instead, a general rule was established and 
the details were left to the relevant legislation. For instance, details of the 
information required in the company’s annual report were not specified in the 
guide; these required details were left for the Instructions of Issuing Companies 
Disclosure, Accounting and Auditing Standards.  
It was decided that the application of these rules would initially be through 
"compliance or explain" approach, which means that companies must comply with 
the rules of the guide, and in case of non compliance with any of these rules, other 
than those based on a legal provision that is binding under responsibility, it would 
be necessary to explain clearly the reason for non compliance in the company’s 
annual report. This approach is intended to give companies flexibility in 
implementing the corporate governance rules and sufficient time to adapt to them, 
in order to enhance awareness of these rules and to achieve full compliance 
gradually. 
It is hoped that the managements of shareholding companies listed on the ASE 
would implement these rules, and that all stakeholders would encourage their 
implementation in order to build confidence in these companies through enhancing 
their management performance, and preserving the rights of all stakeholders, which 
in turn would enhance the performance of our national economy, and increase 




Chapter One - Definitions 
The Company: A shareholding company listed on the ASE. 
Relatives: The father, mother, brother, sister, spouse, and children. 
Independent Member: A member of the board of directors who is not tied to the 
company or any of its upper executive management, affiliate companies, or its 
external auditors by any financial interests or relationships other than his 
shareholding in the company that may be suspected to bring that member benefit, 
whether financial or incorporeal, or that may affect his/ her decisions or lead to 
exploitation of his/ her position with the company. 
The board member loses his independence in any of the following cases: 
1. If he is, or has been, employed by the company or any of its affiliates during the 
last three years preceding his nomination for membership of the board of directors. 
2. If any of his relatives is, or has been, employed in the executive management of 
the company or any of its affiliates during the last three years preceding his 
nomination for membership of the board. 
3. If he or any of his relatives has direct or indirect interest in the contracts, projects 
and engagements signed with the company or any of its affiliates to the value of JD 
50,000 (fifty thousand Jordanian Dinars) or more. 
4. If the member or any of his relatives is a partner of the company's auditor, or if 
he is or has been a partner or employee of the company's external auditor during the 
last three years preceding his nomination for membership of the board. 
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5. If the member has a control in the company of more than 10% of the company's 
capital. 
Non-Executive Board Member: A member who is not employed by, and who 
does not receive a salary from the company. 
Related Party Transactions: Any deal or contract the value of which exceeds JD 
50,000 (fifty thousand Jordanian Dinars) made between the company and any of the 
following parties: 
1. The company's affiliate companies. 
2. Members of the board of directors and upper executive management of the 
company. 
3. Members of the board of directors or the management committee, upper 
management, and upper executive management of the affiliate company. 
4. Any person who holds more than 5% of the shares of the company or one of its 
affiliates. 
5. Relatives and partners of the above parties. 
6. Saving funds of the company's employees. 
7. The company's joint ventures with any other parties. 
8. Companies under control of members of the board of directors and the upper 
executive management and their relatives. 
Cumulative Voting: When each shareholder holds a number of votes equal to the 
number of shares that he owns, and he uses them to vote for one candidate for 
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membership of the board of directors or distributes them among the candidates of 
his choice, without repeating these votes. 
Stakeholders: Persons who have vested interests in the company, including its 
shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, and prospective investors. 
Committees: Permanent committees formed by the board of directors, namely; the 
Nominations and Compensations Committee, and Audit Committee. 
Insider at the Company: A person who has access to internal information by 
virtue of his position or function within the company, including the chairman and 
members of the board of directors and the company’s general manager, financial 
manager and internal auditor, the representative of the legal person, and relatives of 
the above- mentioned persons. 
Chapter Two: The Board of Directors of a Shareholding Company 
1. The administration of the Company is entrusted to a board of directors whose 
members shall be not less than five and not more than thirteen, as determined by the 
Company’s memorandum of association. Principles of good corporate governance 
require that board members be elected by the company’s general assembly in a 
secret ballot, by means of cumulative voting system, provided that at least one third 
of the board members are independent members. If the result in calculating the 
above- mentioned third is with a fraction, the fraction is removed by rounding the 
result to the following figure. 
2. The board of directors shall manage the company for the period specified in the 
company’s memorandum of association, provided that this period must not be less 
than three years and not more than four years starting on the date of its election. 
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3. A legal board member person shall name a natural person to represent him during 
the board’s term of office. 
4. The board of directors represents all shareholders. It should exercise due 
professional care in managing the company, and devote the time needed to carry out 
its activities in honesty and transparency in order to serve the company's interests 
and realize its objectives. 
5. It is not allowed for one person to hold the positions of chairman of the board of 
directors and any executive position in the company at the same time. 
6. Member of the board of directors should be qualified and enjoys adequate 
knowledge and experience in administrative affairs. He should also be aware of 
relevant legislation and of the rights and duties of the board. 
7. A member of the board of directors or his representative should not be a member 
of the board or a representative of a member of the board of directors of another 
company that has similar business, has identical objectives, or is a competitor 
thereof. In all cases, a natural person must not combine membership of the boards 
of more than five companies whether in his personal capacity or as a representative 
of a legal person. 
8. The company is not allowed to provide a cash loan of any kind to the chairman or 
any member of the board of directors or to any of their relatives. Excluded from this 
condition are banks and financial companies that may advance loans to any of the 
aforesaid persons within the limits of these companies’ objectives and in 
accordance with the same conditions that apply to all customers. 
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9. The company shall provide members of the board of directors with all 
information and data related to the company, to enable them to perform their duties 
and to be aware of all aspects related to the company's work. 
10. The board of directors shall ensure that members of the executive management 
have the administrative and technical qualifications and experience that they need 
to carry out their duties. 
11. The board may seek the opinion of any external consultant at the company’s 
expense provided that the majority of board members approve the measure and that 
there is no conflict of interests. 
12. The chairman of the board of directors or any board member or the company’s 
general manager or its auditor is required, under legal responsibility, to notify the 
supervisory authorities concerned in any of the following cases: 
A. If the company suffers financial or administrative disorders or if it suffers 
serious losses that affect the rights of its shareholders or creditors. 
B. If the company’s board of directors or any board member or the company’s 
general manager exploits his/their powers and position/s in any manner that derives 
benefit to him/ them or to others in an illegal manner. This provision shall apply 
equally should any of the above refrain from carrying out this an activity that is 
required by law. 
C. If the company’s board of directors or any board member or the company’s 
general manager perform any act that implies fraud, embezzlement, 
misrepresentation, forgery or betrayal of confidence in a manner that affects the 
rights of the Company, its shareholders or others. 
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Section One: Board of Directors Tasks and Responsibilities 
The board of directors shall set an internal by-law to be reviewed annually, which 
defines in details the duties, powers, and responsibilities of the board of directors, 
including: 
1. Setting strategies, policies, plans and procedures that realize the objectives of the 
company, serve its interests, maximize the rights of its shareholders, and serve the 
local community. 
2. Setting necessary procedures to ensure that all shareholders, including non-
Jordanians, enjoy their full rights and that they are treated in justice and equality 
without any discrimination. 
3. Taking necessary measures to ensure compliance with the laws in force. 
4. Setting a risk management policy to address the risks that the company may face. 
5. Organizing the company's financial, accounting and administrative affairs by 
means of special internal regulations. 
6. Preparing annual, semiannual and quarterly reports and annual preliminary 
results on the company's activities, including financial statements for each period in 
accordance with the laws in force. Dates of disclosure of these financial statements 
should be announced at least before three working days. 
7. Setting the company’s disclosure and transparency policy, and overseeing its 
implementation in accordance with the requirements of the regulatory authorities 
and the laws in force. 
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8. Setting procedures that forbid insiders in the company from using inside 
information to achieve material or moral gains. 
9. Setting a clear authorization policy for the company identifying the authorized 
personnel and the limits of the powers entrusted to them. 
10. Appointing the company's general manager and terminating his services. 
11. Defining duties and powers of the company’s executive management. 
12. Taking necessary steps to ensure internal supervision on the company’s work in 
progress, including ensuring compliance with the laws in force, the requirements of 
supervisory authorities, policies, plans and procedures set by the board of directors. 
13. Reviewing and evaluating the performance of the company’s executive 
management, and the degree to which it implements the strategies, policies, plans 
and procedures in force. 
14. Setting a mechanism for receiving shareholders' complaints and suggestions, 
including those related to listing certain items on the agenda of the general 
assembly meeting, in a manner that would ensure that they are studied and that 
proper action is taken on them within a certain period of time. 
15. Adopting criteria for granting incentives, compensations, and privileges to 
members of the board of directors and executive management, in a manner that 
serves the company’s interests and realizes its objectives. 
16. Setting a policy to organize relations with stakeholders in a manner that ensures 
fulfillment of the company’s commitments towards them, safeguards their rights, 
provides them with adequate information, and maintains good relations with them. 
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17. Setting written procedures for implementing the rules of good corporate 
governance in the company and reviewing them annually to evaluate the degree to 
which they are implemented. 
Section Two: Committees Formed by the Board of Directors 
1. The board of directors shall form the following permanent committees: 
A. The Audit Committee, whose tasks are defined under the “Disclosure and 
Transparency Chapter.” 
B. The Nominations and Compensations Committee, whose main tasks are: 
I. Ensuring the independence of independent members on a continuous basis. 
II. Setting the policy of compensations, privileges, incentives, and salaries and to 
review them on a yearly basis. 
III. Defining the company's needs of qualifications at the upper executive 
management and employees levels, and the criteria for their selection. 
IV. Drawing the company’s human resources and training policy, monitoring its 
implementation, and reviewing it on an annual basis. 
2. The committees shall be composed of not less than three non-executive members 
of the board of directors, at least two of whom must be independent members and 
one of the two independent members must preside over the committee. 
3. The committees with the approval of the board of directors shall set written 
procedures that regulate their activities and define their duties. 
280 
 
4. The committees above- mentioned shall make their decisions and 
recommendations by an absolute majority vote by their members. 
5. The committees shall submit their reports and recommendations to the board of 
directors, and a report on their activities to the company’s general assembly annual 
meeting. 
6. The committees shall enjoy the following powers: 
A. Requesting any information from the company's employees who should 
cooperate in providing this information fully and accurately. 
B. Seeking legal, financial, administrative or technical advice from any external 
consultant. 
C. Requesting the presence of any employee to provide the committee with more 
clarifications. 
7. The board of directors may form committees to carry out specific tasks for 
limited periods of time in accordance with procedures that define issues related to 
the committee such as its mandate, duration and powers. 
Section Three: Meetings of the Board of Directors 
1. The board of directors shall be convened to meet by a written invitation from its 
chairman or by a written request submitted to the chairman by at least one-quarter 
of the board members, in the presence of the absolute majority of board members. 
2. Voting on the board of directors’ decisions shall be in person. Voting by proxy, 
by correspondence, or by any other indirect manner shall not be permitted. 
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3. Decisions of the board of directors shall be adopted by an absolute majority of 
members present at the meeting. 
4. The board of directors shall meet at least once every two months, provided that 
the number of meetings in the fiscal year must not be less than six. 
5. The board of directors shall appoint the secretary of the board who shall record 
minutes of board meetings and its decisions, as well as the list of members present 
and any reservations that they express in a special sequentially numbered register. 
Chapter Three: General Assembly Meetings 
1. The general assembly is composed of all shareholders who have the right to vote. 
2. The general assembly shall hold an ordinary meeting at least once a year, 
provided that it takes place within the four months following the end of the 
company’s fiscal year. The general assembly may also hold an extraordinary 
meeting at any time in accordance with the legislations in force. 
3. The board of directors shall address an invitation to each shareholder to attend 
the general assembly meeting, which should be delivered either by hand, or 
ordinary mail and e-mail to the shareholder at least twenty one days before the date 
set for the meeting. Appropriate preparations should be made for the meeting, 
including the choice of time and place, in a manner that encourages and helps the 
largest possible number of shareholders to attend. 
4. The invitation to the meeting should specify the place and time of the meeting. It 
should be accompanied by the agenda of the meeting which should include in detail 
and clear manner topics to be addressed, in addition to any documents or 
attachments related to these subjects. The rules of good corporate governance for 
282 
 
companies require that no new topic should be addressed at the meeting that was 
not listed on the agenda sent previously to the shareholders. 
5. A shareholder who wishes to nominate himself for membership of the board of 
directors shall send his CV prior to the end of the fiscal year preceding the year in 
which the meeting of the general assembly would meet to elect the board. The 
board shall attach this CV to the invitation to the general assembly meeting that it 
addresses to shareholders. 
6. The board of directors shall announce the date and place of the general assembly 
meeting at least twice in three local daily newspapers and on the website of the 
company. 
7. A shareholder may deputize another shareholder to attend the general assembly 
meeting in his place, by means of a written proxy authorization, or to deputize 
another person by means of a judicial proxy in accordance with the legislations in 
force. 
8. The chairman of the board or, in his absence the vice-chairman shall preside over 
the general assembly meeting. Should they both be absent, the general assembly 
elects a chairman for the meeting. The number of board members present at the 
general assembly meeting must not be less than the number required to constitute a 
legal quorum for any board meeting. 
9. The general assembly meeting shall be directed in a manner that allows 
shareholders to participate effectively, express their opinions freely, receive 
answers to their questions, and provide them with sufficient information that 
enables them to take their decisions. 
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Chapter Four: Shareholders' Rights 
The company shall take appropriate measures to ensure that shareholders enjoy 
their rights in a manner that would achieve justice and equality without 
discrimination. These rights include mainly: 
Section One: General Rights 
1. The company shall maintain shareholders ownerships records containing 
information including their names, number of shares they hold, any restrictions on 
ownerships, and any changes that occurred to such. 
2. Access to shareholder records related to any shareholder for any reason 
whatsoever, and to the complete record for reasonable cause. 
3. Access to information and documents of the company in accordance with the 
laws in force. 
4. Receiving periodic and non-periodic information that is disclosed in accordance 
with legislations in force. 
5. Participating and voting in general assembly meetings in person or by proxy with 
a number of votes equal to the number of shares that he holds in the company. 
6. Receiving annual dividends within thirty days from the date of the decision taken 
by the general assembly to distribute them. 
7. Priority to subscribe in any new share issuance by the company, before these 
shares are offered to other investors. 
8. Filing a lawsuit against the board of directors or any of its members claiming 
compensation for damages incurred as a result of a violation of the legislations in 
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force or of the company’s memorandum of association or any mistake or negligence 
in administering the company, or of disclosure of company secrets. 
9. Filing a lawsuit against the company’s general manager or any of the company's 
employees claiming compensation for damages incurred as a result of disclosing the 
company's secrets. 
10. Requesting an extraordinary general assembly meeting by shareholders who 
hold 25% of the company’s subscribed shares. 
11. Requesting an extraordinary general assembly meeting by shareholders holding 
20% of the company shares to request the resignation of the chairman of the board 
of directors or any board member. 
12. Requesting the audit of the company’s activities and records by shareholders 
holding 10% of the company shares. 
13. Filing a lawsuit to contest the legality of any general assembly meeting or to 
contest the decisions taken in that meeting within three months of the meeting. 
14. Access to the minutes of the company’s general assembly meetings. 
Section Two: Rights within the powers of the General Assembly 
The General Assembly enjoys wide powers, particularly the power to take decisions 
affecting the future of the company, which include: 
1. Discussing the company’s performance and its plans for the coming period with 
the board of directors. 
2. Electing members of the board of directors. 
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3. Electing the external auditor. 
4. Approving the financial statements of the company. 
5. Amending the articles of association and memorandum of association of the 
company, particularly provisions related to the change in its objectives. 
6. Issues related to merger, incorporation or liquidation of the company. 
7. Dismissing the board of directors, the chairman or any board member. 
8. Selling the company or acquiring another company. 
9. Raising or lowering the company’s capital. 
10. Issuing corporate bonds convertible to shares. 
11. Enabling the employees to own the company's shares. 
12. Purchasing or selling the company’s shares. 
13. Selling the company’s assets in full or a significant portion of the assets that 
might affect the realization of the company’s objectives. 
 
Chapter Five: Disclosure and Transparency 
1. The company shall establish written work procedures in accordance with the 
disclosure policy adopted by the board of directors to regulate disclosure of 
information and follow up on the implementation of the policy in accordance with 
the requirements of the regulatory authorities and the legislations in force. 
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2. The company shall provide shareholders and investors with accurate, clear, 
timely disclosure information, in accordance with the requirements of the 
supervisory authorities and the legislations in force, in a manner that would enable 
them to take their decisions. This includes disclosures related to: 
- Periodic reports. 
- Material information. 
- Dealings of insiders and their relatives in securities issued by the company, 
including members of the board of directors and upper executive management. 
- Related party transactions. 
- The privileges of members of the board of directors and upper executive 
management. 
3. The company shall organize its accounts and keep its books and records in 
accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
4. The company shall use its internet web-site to enhance disclosure and 
transparency, and to provide information. 
5. The company shall disclose its policy regarding the local community and the 
environment. 
6. No insider in the company may disclose inside information related to the 
company to parties other than the authorities concerned or the judiciary. It is not 
allowed to trade in securities issued by the company or to urge others to trade in 




Section One: The Audit Committee 
1. All members of the Audit Committee must have knowledge and experience in 
finance and accounting, and at least one of them must have worked previously in 
accounting or finance fields, and that person must have an academic or professional 
certificate in accounting, finance or related fields. 
2. The Committee shall meet regularly, not less than four times a year, and minutes 
of its meetings must be taken appropriately. 
3. The company shall put at the disposal of the Committee all facilities that it needs 
to perform its duties, including the authority to seek expert assistance whenever 
needed. 
4. At least once a year, the Audit Committee shall meet with the company’s 
external auditor, without the presence of the executive management or any person 
representing it. 
Section Two: Duties of the Audit Committee 
The Audit Committee shall undertake the task of overseeing and monitoring 
accounting and internal control and auditing activities in the company, including the 
following: 
1. Discussing matters related to the nomination of the external auditor to ensure that 
he meets all the requirements stipulated in legislations in force, and to ensure his 
independence. 
2. Discussing matters related to the work of the external auditor, including his, 
observations, suggestions, and reservations, pursuing the level of responsiveness of 
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the company’s management to them, and submitting recommendations to the board 
of directors accordingly. 
3. Reviewing the company’s correspondence with the external auditor, evaluating 
its contents, and providing comments and recommendations thereabout to the board 
of directors. 
4. Monitoring the company's compliance with Laws and regulations in force, and 
the requirements of regulatory institutions. 
5. Studying periodic reports prior to their presentation to the board of directors, and 
submitting recommendations thereabout, with emphasis on: 
A. Any change in the company’s accounting policies. 
B. Any change in the company's accounts as a result of the auditing processes or the 
suggestions of the external auditor. 
6. Studying the external auditor's plan of work, and ensuring that the company 
provides him with all facilities needed to perform his work. 
7. Studying and evaluating the internal control and auditing procedures. 
8. Reviewing the external auditor’s evaluation of internal control and auditing 
procedures 
9. Reviewing the external auditor’s reports, particularly those related to any 
violations revealed by the internal auditor. 
10. Submitting recommendations to the board of directors regarding internal audit 
procedures and the work of the external auditor. 
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11. Ensuring that no conflict of interest may arise from the company’s transactions, 
contracts or projects with related parties. 
12. Reviewing and approving related party transactions prior to their ratification by 
the company. 
13. Any other issues determined by the board of directors. 
Section Three: Powers of the Audit Committee 
1. Requesting the presence of the external auditor if the Committee sees the need to 
discuss with him any issues related to his work at the company. It also has the 
authority to request clarifications or to seek his opinion in writing. 
2. Submitting recommendations to the board of directors to nominate the external 
auditor for election by the general assembly. 
3. Nominating a candidate to be appointed as the company’s internal auditor. 
Section Four: The External Auditor 
1. The general assembly shall elect one or more licensed auditor/s to perform an 
external audit of the company in accordance with the international auditing 
standards, the requirements and rules of the profession, and the legislations in force. 
2. The external auditor shall exercise his duties for one-year renewable, provided 
that the renewal for the partner at the external auditor may not be for more than four 
consecutive years, and the re-election may not take place before a minimum of two 
years. 
3. The company shall take appropriate actions to ensure the following: 
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A. The company’s external auditor is not a founder, a shareholder, a member of its 
board of directors, or a partner or an employee of any member of the board of 
directors. 
B. The external auditor does not perform any additional services to the company 
such as administrative or technical consultations. 
C. The external auditor is independent in accordance with international auditing 
standards. 
D. The external auditor performs his duties impartially without interference from 
the board of directors or the executive management. 
4. The company is not allowed to appoint any employee of the external auditor 
office in the company’s upper management before at least one year from the date of 
his employment termination at the auditor's office. 
5. The company’s external auditor should: 
A. Possess a valid license to practice the profession. 
B. Be a member of the Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants. 
C. Have practiced the profession on a full time basis for at least three consecutive 
years, after receiving his license to practice the auditing profession. 
D. Have in his firm at least one partner or employee who must also meet the above- 
mentioned requirements. 
6. External auditor's duties: 
A. Performing the duties assigned to him in impartiality and independence. 
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B. Monitoring the company’s operations. 
C. Auditing the company’s accounts in accordance with international standards and 
the accepted profession rules. 
D. Examining the financial, administrative, and internal auditing systems of the 
company and submitting his opinion on their effectiveness and ensuring their 
suitability for the company's business and safeguarding of its assets. 
E. Verifying ownership of the company’s assets and the legality of its obligations. 
F. Attending meetings of the company’s general assembly. 
G. Answering questions and inquiries from shareholders with regard to the financial 
statements and closing accounts, at the general assembly meetings. 
H. Expressing opinion on the fairness of the company’s financial statements, and to 
ask for their amendment if there is anything that affects their fairness. 
I. Reporting to the authorities concerned any violation of the law, or any financial 










How ownership variables are calculated for AL-EKBAL PRINTING AND 
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How ownership variables are calculated for PETRA EDUCATION COMPANY, 
annual report 2016 (p.22). 
Number of shares owned by members of the Board of Directors and senior 
management executives and their relatives 
Board of Directors: 








Shaker Co. Ltd. 
Vice Chairman Saudi 2.184.206 
Mohammed Reda 
Al - Ansari 
Member of Board 









Member of Board 
of Directors 
Jordanian 788.015 
Mousa Mousa El 
Moati 









Hussein Al - 
Masri 




Mazen Al - Ansari 





Member of Board 
of Directors 
Jordanian 243.200 
Samaha Company  Member of Board 
of Directors 
Jordanian 10.000 
Senior Management  
Name Position Nationality Number of Shares 
as 31.Dec.2016 
Mohammed Reda 







Managerial ownership is calculated as the proportion of the firm's shares owned 
by the managers over the total number of shares outstanding. 
  MOW 





Institutional ownership measured by percentage of shares owned by institutions to 
the total number of shares issued. 
  IOW 
  2472054 
  2184206 
  1500000 
  243200 





Foreign ownership measured by percentage of shares owned by foreigners to the 
total number of shares issued. 
  FOW 
  2184206 










Family ownership measured by percentage of shares owned by families to the total 
number of shares issued. 
  FAOW 
  4461021 





Board ownership is measured by the proportion of shares owned by directors over 
the total number of shares outstanding. 
  BOW 
  2472054 
  2184206 
  4461021 
  1500000 
  788015 
  450000 
  114000 
  40000 
  30000 
  243200 
  10000 
Total 12292496 
Outstanding 16000000 
% 0.77 
 
 
